This article attempts to explain spatial diffusion of Japanese enterprises within the Federal
The locational behavior of Japanese enterprises has been influenced, on the one hand , by the altering of the west German urban system, on the other hand , by the changing firm structure itself. For the three sectors, trade, other services and production , it is obtained that each sector has a characteristic location pattern, which received certain alterations during the investigated period.
The results suggest that, in an advanced stage of diffusion, the presence of foreign enterprises can be used as a simple indicator for alterations of economic growth in an urban system. INTRODUCTION
Some dimensions of Japanese firms abroad
More attention has been given to the strong expanding overseas investment of Japanese fi rms. Most of these studies are involved in the internal organization of Japanese management.
A concentration on case and comparative stud ies has lead to an overestimate of the Japanese management system, with lifetime commit ment, consolidated decision-making, quality circle and company labor unions. This caused the Japanese model of management to be em braced abroad-although existing cultural and institutional differences were ignored. This led to the wrong assumption that one could merely achieve an increase in productivity through the adoption of the Japanese management system (PARK, 1985) . Correspondingly, EDGINGTON (1988) empha However, the external relationships of Japa nese firms reach farther than the conglomerates of Japanese industrial groupings.
While Japa nese enterprises stay in hard competition with each other in the home market, abroad they build up a common frontier to conquer foreign markets (ABEGGLEN AND STALK, 1985; FRANKO, 1984) . To mimic this kind of western view; in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Japanese enterprises are allied under the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Dusseldorf (JCCI). Several researchers have studied about the phenomenon of overspreading multinational enterprises (KNICKERBOCKER, 1973; DUNNING, 1981 DUNNING, ,1988 OZAWA, 1979; KOJIMA,1978; DICKEN, 1988; HILL, 1989 a.o.) . But the results of these empirical and eclectic approaches do not pro duce a basic theory to explain the internation alization process of enterprises nor their loca tional behavior.
One useful approach was VERNON's (1966) explanation of international investment and international trade in the con text of the product cycle. Like theories of other economists it works only on the international scale. For the purpose of analyzing the loca tional behavior within a country such theories are not appropriate. Neither classic geographic theories, like location theory (WEBER, 1909; BEHRENDS, 1961) nor central place theory (CHRISTALLER, 1933) are useful in explaining the determinants of the dynamic expansion process of Japanese firms in Germany.
The central place theory is still essentially static, and little research has been undertaken to extend its applicability to the changing rel ative importance of central places through time (BARTELS,1979) .
A development-theoretical settlement system analysis in the innovation diffusion theory produced by the Schools of Lund and Berkeley, has been able to close the lack of dynamics of the aforementioned theories (HAGERSTRAND, 1952; PRED, 1975) . Under this theoretical ap proach Japanese firms could be seen as an in novation in the West German economic-urban system.
Regions which receive Japanese in vestment are to be understood as so called adopting units. adoption centers in more distant locations), a condensing stage (relative rate of adoption is similar in all locations) and a saturation stage (indicating a glowing of the diffusion process as well as a general but slow asymptotic increase to a maximum acceptance). Diffusion is to be understood as the spread or movement of a phenomenon over space and through time. Diffusion processes have been distinguished on the basis of expansion or re location, or the structural character, i.e, conta gious or hierarchical.
The pattern of a hierar chical graduated wavelike diffusion is a com bination of the above mentioned single process, and was clearly described by BAHRENBERG AND LABODA (1973) as follows:
"The innovation starts in a center or in se veral.
From there it expands with a wavelike motion into the surrounding areas.
At the same moment it jumps to centers of a less hierarchical level, in which the innovation is adopted before the center is reached by the wave. In the following time from the old as from the new center the wavelike dif fusion continues and the innovation jumps to the center of the next hierarchical level. This (kind of) process continues until all areas are included and the innovation has been adopted everywhere. Al together, several waves appear, which are trans mitted by centers of different hierarchical levels. These waves are different in their range. In the case of waves starting from higher centers, the range is a result of the greater area of influence in the hierarchical lower centers."
All processes of diffusion are affected by barriers, which hinder the expansion process or can also bring it to a standstill. According to their quality, barriers have different blocking effects (YUILL, 1965) . "In most cases, barriers are permeable rather than absolute, allowing part of the energy of a diffusion pulse to go through, but generally slowing down the proc ess in the local area" (ABLER, ADAMS AND COULD, 1977) . The expansion process is disturbed by various kinds of barriers.
Cultural and lan guage barriers are common examples. In real ity, they don't have to be of visible or physical form, only perceptible (GIESE, 1978 (HAGERSTRAND, 1953) . It is possible to draw the conclusion that besides the structure of the adaptor, the char acter of the innovation induces the feature of the diffusion process. Therefore, in the case of diffusion studies, it is of extreme importance to deepen the knowledge about the research object and its character. One cannot inevitably presume that an innovation expands at any time, led by the hierarchy of social communi cation.
More important than to plot the pattern of spatial diffusion is to identify the relevant communication channels (SUGIURA, 1986 ).
Hagerstrand defines diffusion of innovation as a function of communication.
Of course if there is not sufficient information about in vestment possibilities, Japanese enterprises will not spend money. Nevertheless quantity and quality are not the only determinants of con stitutive decisions. This precipitates a time lag between the adoption of information and the resulting action.
Likewise the intermediate time interval is also important, because it em braces a non-visible, mental or perceptional process. This time interval could be found in the orientation phase of firms in the form of a representative office operating until the foun dation of an enterprise according to German law. The foundation of an enterprise is very carefully prepared.
The job of "pushed for ward" representative and information offices is to collect and evaluate information about the market, customers and competitors.
In the second phase, they make contacts, organize distribution channels, and conduct interviews with the potential suppliers. Finally, according to the purpose of investment, they choose a right location for their overseas branch. The phase of the representative office varies corre sponding to the sector. Investment in the pro duction sector takes much longer than in trade and service. But MERZ AND PARK (1986) also reported that constitutive decisions will be carried out very quickly when a certain amount of information is reached. The time interval is not only a problem of the quantity of informa tion, but is also an informational resource prob lem that will be determined by the rapidity of the utilised information channels.
Therefore, the analysis of the diffusion process is differ entiated into the study of connecting lines and junctions (HAGERSTRAND, 1966) . Intersection lines are routes, along which information and influences flow. Information will be transmit ted or diverted by junctions. Junctions could be understood as an individual or as a unit of several individuals (here: firms at the same lo cation) with their reaction on information and information fields.
In general, the information fi eld of an individual is a specific set of mental information about surrounding environmental elements.
Naturally most of the information fields have steep distance gradients, which means an individual has more information about closer locations than about farther loca tions. Thus the expansion of innovation relies on contacts with another individual, which transforms specific information.
A basic theo rem of HAGERSTRAND is to conceptualize the expansion of innovation over the earth's sur face, that is the adoption of innovation at first is a product of a learning and communication process (BROWN, 1981) . It is a well-known fact that the possibility of receiving information is greater the better the education of an individ ual. In the case of the Japanese manager, their function and integration of specific innovative and informative circles should be further per ceptional criteria for this analysis. Therefore, the degree of integration of the Japanese man ager in Germany considerably differs with lo cation, because common economical and social institutions exist only in a few centers. The Japanese enclave in Dusseldorf is said to be a "miniature society" of their home country .
With this, the Japanese managers in Dusseldorf has various formal and informal information networks at their disposal, meanwhile manag ers at other locations see themselves limited to only a few acquainted interchange possibilities. During the course of this, one should not forget that the activity of a coordinating prop agandist could be able to decisively determine the spatial diffusion process as well as its re sulting patterns (MEYER, 1976) .
3.
The purpose of this study
The purpose of this study was to investigate: 1) if the spatial spread of Japanese firms follow the principles of diffusion;
2) if the expansion was steered through an information network directed to the firms and what are the other determinants of the diffu sion mechanism;
3) what kind of influences did the alteration of Japanese firm structure have on the location strategy.
The findings of this study could also be useful to understand certain changes in the German postwar urban system.
II. THE METHOD AND THE MATERIAL
The first step was to plot a series of maps to differentiate phases of invasion and to find out the main expansion direction of Japanese firms. Namely based on the diffusion theory concept, hypotheses were worked out for the proposal of examining a mechanism responsible for the spatial diffusion process.
For testing these hypotheses, a multiple regression model was used, similar to the ones already used by GIESE (1978) , BAHRENBERG AND LABODA (1973) and BARTELS (1968) for explaining a hierarchical contagious diffusion process. To propose the steering mechanism of the spatial diffusion of Japanese companies in Germany, the following hypotheses have been put forth and made op erational. To identify specific connection lines, a member list of the Japanese Chamber of Com merce and Industry was used, which is under stood to be a central junction in the information network of Japanese enterprises.
In this insti tution, Japanese entrepreneurs have regular consultations and work out strategies to cope with common difficulties.
Hypotheses were developed to test the research question of in teraction, as follows: Japanese written infor mation exchange can only be understood by firm representatives, which are Japanese . On the other hand, only Japanese are able to reportt about the business conditions of their location. These facts draw nearer to the idea of an ab sorbing diffusion barrier. Therefore, the Japa nese Chamber of Commerce and Industry is to be seen as a central nodal point in their infor mation network.
The conjunct enterprises could rely on quick and solid information, which makes management abroad more ef fi cient for them. The higher the regional occu pation of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry enterprises are in a region, the better the probability of further settlements .
Centrality and the hierarchical effects
The exchange rate of information between economic subjects is a function of centrality. Thus, the realization of possible sales depends on the procuring and sales contacts. Such contacts are rising with the employees in cer tain sectors like service, transport and trade. Representative offices which only function as a firm address or prepare investments were not included.
Only firms which were German by law or rather objectively direct investments were admitted into the investigation.
In this analyses, 409 enterprises were involved. Members of the Japanese Chamber of Com merce and Industry were identified by a list of members from the same organization.
The en terprise related data base was built up to an individual data bank.
According to the for mulation of the question, aggregational proce dures were carried out on different regional levels and interconnected with a regional data set, which was specially created during an in ternship at the BfLR (German Research Center for Geography and Environmental Planning) for the purpose of this investigation.
III.
THE RESULTS 1987b). Correspondingly, locational prefer ences were found by the special traders, whose primary business was mostly related to the steel industry and therefore the buying of cap ital goods, as well as by the general trading companies, whose interests allowed them to deal not only with the buying of capital goods, but also the selling of consumer goods. These firms opened their trading offices in Dusseldorf, the so called "writing desk of the Ruhr region", because this location offered the best opportu nity to utilize the agglomeration advantages to contact the German steel and heavy industry companies (ZIELKE, 1982) . The concentration of administrative functions of German companies in Dusseldorf was a great benefit for the city as well as for the Japanese competitors. Conse quently, Japanese pioneer enterprises were the so-called German Bussan (Mitsui), the general trading houses of Marubeni and Sumitomo and the trade with the steel specializing companies of Tokyo Boeki and Yawata Iron Steel (Shin Nippon Steel). They laid the foundation stones and until today, continue the process of gath ering momentum, which made Dusseldorf into a center of Japanese economic activity in the Federal Republic of Germany. With the settlement of the marketing com panies, an important stage of the multi nationalization process was reached. Japanese industrial production grew at an accelerating rate and with it the exports. Correspondingly, the Japanese government enacted between 1969 and 1972 four liberalization amendments, which relaxed the former rigid foreign invest ment regulation laws (JETRO, 1977) . This im mediately caused an investment boom in the Federal Republic of Germany with a clear high point in 1973. In 1974, the boom was dampened through the recession caused by the first oil shock. The enthusiasm of the Japanese foreign investors soon decreased. Thus the second oil shock constituted less of a collapse of their investment activity as before. This was also caused by a shift in investment strategy, which will be discussed below in the context of firm structure and their locational changes.
The trade and marketing companies secured not only the sales of the home production plant, but also entered the foreign production stage (located mainly in the South East Asia). For a marketing orientated sales strategy, an inland location was more to be recommended, which was centrally located to other regional markets. The handicap of the locational choices of the general trading companies influenced the lo cational preferences of the firms that followed , which increasingly wanted to manage their sales by themselves, but nevertheless entrusted their business to the great trading companies who were well experienced with the German market. The already existing relations with the great trading companies in Japan, especially to the Sogo Shosha, had been utilized as well . Corresponding to the trend of greater inde pendence of the producers, the Sogo Shosha had an interest commercializing their experiences and contributed only rarely to projects of the producers abroad.
Such external advantages were an important incentive to include the chosen location of the great trading companies in their locational preferences.
The city gov ernment of Dusseldorf promoted the systematic settlement of Japanese enterprises (ZIELKE, 1982) . The Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the Japanese Trader and Producer located in Germany had been timely established before the first foundation boom of marketing offices of the Japanese producers, who tried , to con struct their own distribution channels for their own products. It should be mentioned that one difference they had as compared to the great trading companies was the need of information services from the external side. Because of the commercial character of the assistance received from the Sogo Shosha and the attached con tracts of participation or profit share, the smaller companies have been endeavoring to detach themselves from the great traders. Because full membership can only be re ceived by those enterprises located within North-Rhine Westfalia (NRW), the special membership holders in other countries (Lander) of West Germany had no right to vote in the main meetings of the JCCI, but through the strategic connection of headquarters located in NRW and recently distributed branches all over West Germany their actual area of validity reached far over NRW (SCHLUNZE, 1991a) .
2) The diffusion phase
The producers in Japan are the original power of the overseas expansion. One can pick up from Figure 1 that as Japanese industrial production increased every year, more and more branches (most of them sales branches of the producers) were founded in the Federal Republic of Germany. It shows clearly that the economic situation had a strong influence on the development of the establishment of Japa nese firms in Germany. ABBGLEN (1986) place according to the "hierarchical principle". Therefore, a successive jumping of the innova tion of "Japanese enterprises" occurred from the innovation centers in the north to the innova tion centers in the south. After World War II , the process of the spatial diffusion of Japanese enterprises started in Hamburg , then jumped over to Dusseldorf in the same decade as re ported in detail above. In 1961, with the first Japanese sales branch in Offenbach, the area around Frankfurt was reached. It was not until the third decade, that the expansion extended to the south, with the first trading companies in the areas around Stuttgart (ESSLINGEN , 1970) and MUNCHEN (1971) being founded. It was in this way that after twenty years of the first foundations in Hamburg that the hierarchical diffusion process was basically carried out . The hierarchical diffusion and therefore the rapid, spatial extensive expansion , was led by the trading companies.
They have been fol lowed by sales branches, which are seen as two types, the so called early and late majority . These findings can be found in Figure 3 . for the Japanese investors.
Although the building and construction trade is counted under the secondary sector, it was intentionally assigned to the service sector be cause these enterprises have been exclusively orientated to the demands of the Japanese fi rms. An example of this is the building firm Takenaka-Kajima consultants, which erected the Japanese school in Dusseldorf and the Re search and Development center of Mazda in Weisskirchen near Frankfurt a.M.. The quick ness and effectiveness were praised by the in vestors, while complaints of the slowness of the German contractors grew (PARK AND SCHLUNZE, 1991) . This showed what kind of efforts are necessary for a successful engagement abroad. On the other hand, such effectiveness in the area services showed to what extent the eco nomic activity of Japanese enterprises had al ready progressed. From a geographical point of view, services could indicate the appearance of the condensing stage, because their potential customers are mainly Japanese enterprises.
In the case of Dusseldorf, to reach this stage was a necessary prerequisite for the spatial expansion of economic activity in West Germany. More than an "enclave" (ZIELKE, 1982) , Dusseldorf, with its high concentration of Japanese enter prises, is to be understood as an motorical unit, which creates secondary, tertiary and quartiary centers in a diffusion process, like Frankfurt, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Munchen. According to this, the service firms are concentrated in innovation centers and thus indicates the new expansion direction of Japanese enterprises. These results suggest that location specific ad vantages may be generally realized when a certain degree of independence from the cen trifugal forces of the primary innovation center is achieved.
In a second phrase of the diffusion process the wavelike diffusion gradually breaks through.
So in the period of the 1960's Japa nese firms expanded into the surrounding cou ntry side of Hamburg: Storman (1965), Pinne berg (1966 ), Herzogtum Lauenburg (1969 . In the area of Dusseldorf the first districts (Kreise) were Mettmann (1961) and Neuss (1963) . Also the surrounding districts of Frankfurt were caught by the activities of Japanese Investors:
1964 the Wetteraukreis,1968 the Taunus-Kreis and 1969 the GroB-Gerau districts received trade branches, but also early investment in the production sector was undertaken in Frankfurt a.M. (1963) and Offenbach (1967) . Meanwhile, as in the case of the innovation centers of Hamburg and Dusseldorf, after nearly a decade passed, the new innovation centers such as Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munchen immediately expanded into the surrounding area. Charac teristic of wavelike diffusion, it is the neigh boring districts that will be directly preferred. In the 1960's this process was observable at the innovation centers of Hamburg and Dusseldorf. Likewise in the following decade, as in the case of the southern German innovation centers, the secondary and the tertiary center further ex panded into their hinterland.
Because the investment in Neumunster (1971) and Bremen (1979) were carried out in the production sector, these locations were assigned to the waning expansion power of Hamburg.
Neumunster and Bremen did not attain great importance in the locational struc ture of Japanese enterprises.
Similar is the situation for the branches in Koln and Bonn, as well as in the southern region with the cases of Freiburg and Nirnberg/Furth, which in spite of hierarchical distance could be classified as a more wavelike rather than a hierarchical dif fusion process (see also Fig. 3 ). It is important to add that direct investment in the production sector forced the process of expansive diffusion in the sphere of influence of the Japanese trad ing and service centers. Corresponding to this, MATSUBARA (1989) pointed out that the loca tional patterns of Japanese production plants are identical with the chosen locations of the trade bases, but he also noted that from the 1980's peripherical regions in northern and southern Germany, as in England, have been chosen as locations for production.
However, until recently the hierarchy effect had a greater importance than the effect of expansive diffusion. SCHLUNZE (1991 a, b) found out, in a locational evaluation analysis of Jap anese plants in Germany, that locations with a highly skilled labor market have been preferred to those with a low skilled one. Furthermore, the accessibility of production-orientated ser vices like trade, transport and others was iden tified as a significant locational characteristic. Centrality and agglomeration advantages of the most important urban centers of the German market were an important elements of their settlement strategy.
Thus, the three in novation centers
Hamburg, Dusseldorf and Frankfurt contained 67% in 1970; 53% in 1980; and 49% of the Japanese firms in 1989. In the 1980's the city of Frankfurt received in the course of direct investment for branches of Japanese financial institutions and other ser vices an increased importance in the locational network.
In 1989, Hamburg (8.6%) was over taken by the concentration in Frankfurt (9.1%). In comparison to the surrounding regions of Hamburg, Dusseldorf and Frankfurt, the in vestment in southern regions were only singu lar events. Only Munchen was capable of bind ing 3.8% of Japanese firms.
Corresponding to the theoretical assumption of diffusion, the filling-up-effect decreases with growing dis tance to Dusseldorf, the city which had been ruling as the main center of the expansion process. It appears that the spatial expansion of Japanese enterprises in West Germany was conducted in an initial phase by a hierarchical relocative and afterwards by a hierarchical wavelike diffusion process. MERZ and PARK (1987) found that with the appearance of sales branches of the producers, a downward tendency in the relationship with the general trading companies clearly became recognizable.
Their strongest engagement was in 1973 (LAUMER, 1983) . In terms of geograph ical examinations, these findings could be a hint to the importance of the Sogo Shosha which cannot be attached to a steering role for the extensive diffusion process. Germany, it proclaimed to assist the western trading partners in reducing their trade deficits (GANDOW, 1990) . The actual efforts are directed towards a better information basis for western products in Japan. The procuring of informa tion about technological development in west ern countries is a successful instrument of Japanese industrial policy. The question is who makes the best use of the so-called information centers, which should be built up in all prefec tures of Japan: the importer or the competitor of new German products. Such information can also be found to the advantage of the smaller producers, which by themselves could not afford a marketing office abroad for prospect ing and developing their product. If the pro ducers have the greatest benefit of such a "window to the world market" around the corner, in the context of this study, JETRO's new strategic role could be interpreted as a generator of "departure decisions" for Japanese producers stepping into the export stage.5) Corresponding to their rules, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Dussel dorf (JCCI) is based on the rules of association of Japanese traders and industries (JCCI, 1988) . The primary target is the promotion of trade between Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.
When the JCCI was juristically re corded in 1966, its regional validity was set in the country of North-Rhine Westfalia, because almost 90% of the Japanese enterprises were located within this country; most of them in Dusseldorf. Nowadays the office of the JCCI is located in a representative building, called the Japan Trade Center. The JCCI had taken over the function of suppling the Japanese firms with information, which is useful in conducting business in foreign trade affairs. The JCCI obtained these materials from German and other European information sources, conducted analyses and organized them systematically, bringing them up to date. Similar to the foreign economic service of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the supplying activi ties for Japanese firms are of direct and indirect character.
For example, direct services of the JCCI consist of information services, consulting and support work for preparing the ground for business with European firms. real rate for exchange of the four most impor tant German export branches (chemistry, me chanical engineering, automobile engineering and electrical engineering) deviate consider ably from the average of national rate of ex change. The industry of electrical engineering has especially shown, since 1970, a continually increase in the real exchange rate. Blame must be laid to the Japanese Yen, the currency of the main competitor in this field has been revalued in real terms. The competitive position of a branch can be measured by the revealed comparative advan tage (RCA)7) (MEISSNER AND FASSINGER, 1989) . This value showed the German chemistry and electrical engineering industries with a de creasing tendency between 1970 and 1985. Recently, both branches have been weak on an equal level. The loss of comparative advan tages is regrettable. However, the industries of mechanical and automobile engineering pos sess a steadfast foreign trade position.
In an empirical study, the RCA-value for the foreign trade of Japanese industries in comparison with the EC was calculated for the year 1985. Ac cording to the study, in five of twenty indus tries, Japan possessed a comparative advan tage: electrical engineering, precision engineer ing, automobile assembly, mechanical engi neering as well as musical instruments (HEI TGER AND STEHN, 1989) . It is interesting to note that the sector which represented the highest comparative competitiveness, electrical engi neering, has become weaker for the German side. HEITGER AND STERN prognosticated the erection of additional trade barriers by the EC in industries in which the share of Japanese imports from inland production is high. The progress of the commission of the EC in terms of reduction of internal barriers and by simul taneously enhancing external protection will give rise to an adequate adaptation reaction on the side of Japanese companies. They will try to substitute exports through direct invest ments in the production sector.
This prognosis has already been realized. It is possible to see this from Table 1 , as Japanese direct investment since 1984 in the sector of electrical engineering has been carried out with intensity. Before 1984 the direct investment in the chemistry sector was predominant, but in accordance with comparative advantage, the electrical engineering industry is now prefer red. Recently the sector of electro (precision) group accounted for more than 50% of trade in production.
This bears out the hypothesis of HEITGER AND STEHN that the sector which is already strong in trade will try to substitute their imports by production facilities (Table 3) . As a result, the share of traders and producers in the electro (precision) group is now the high est. Nearly half of the production plants are producing capital goods (Table 2) . Meanwhile, the situation has arisen in which the share of producers of capital goods clearly dominate those of consumer goods. It is normal that such market segments are increasingly preferred, since they lie between the category of con sumer and capital goods. Concerning the case Because more trade companies and market ing offices have capital goods as a main com modity, it can be analogically predicted from the thesis of HEITGER AND STEHN that the Fed eral Republic of Germany will receive more importance as an possible locations for pro duction (Table 4) one of the largest world markets for capital goods. The Federal Republic is not only a huge exporter of electronic goods, but also an im portant sales market for the foreign electronic industry (ZVEI, 1989) . Although perhaps "un challenged", Japan is indisputably the most important exporter of electronic goods to Ger many. A rise in the consumer tax and its re strictive effect on the sale of Japanese consumer goods is responsible for the corresponding proportion of categories of goods with possibil ities of development in the area of the capital goods. The umbrella organization of electron ics industries sees this as of great importance for German industry. The response of Japanese companies can already be recognized as the increase of electronic engineering plants and the concentration of sales branches and plants in this sector indicates. An important location al characteristic of Japanese plants belonging to the electro (precision) group was that they were directed to the regional concentration of their German competitors (SCHLUNZE, 1991 a, b) . The activities of the Japanese enterprises in Germany could be differentiated corresponding to the theory of multinational enterprises into an export stage and an foreign production stage. The export stage can also be broken down into subphases: 1) the export stage car ried out by the great trading companies; 2) the export stage of the producers, which starts (in the case of Germany) with the beginning of the 1970's. The initial phase of the foreign pro duction stage overlaps the export phase , but the expanding phase is clearly in the second half of the 1980's (see also Fig. 2) The scheme above (Table 5) shows what in fl uences the change of the firm structure might have had on the market and locational strategy. Therefore, these findings have more of the characteristics of estimations rather than that of results. Obviously different types of firms have corresponding market strategies and a different locational behavior.
The sectors of trade, service and production are, by them selves, subjected to temporary change. The change of preferences and motives seen in the service sector should be illuminated as follows: the service sector became more and more at tractive for investors in the process of inter nalization. In this case, the relation between the German economy structure and the Japanese foreign trade structure should also be empha sized: Although half of the gross value added of the Federal Republic was achieved by the ser vice sector, only 13% of this sector was rela tively weak in exports during the mid-1980's. The cause is to be seen in higher costs of trans actions in opposing to the cross border goods traffic. In the heterogeneous service sector, costs are very different and decrease the most in the area of information transfer, finance and insurance services. The foreign trade with services is to be evaluated as a very prosperous market in future. The prospects of expansion are good, because the technical process prom ises a further lowering of costs. The multina tional Japanese great trading companies have had early discovery commercialized and are now about to expand in this field. Measured by the number of newly established companies in the 1980's (see Table 6 ), the Sogo Shosha have increased their activities in anticipation of the EC market and have concentrated them mainly in the service sector. Thanks to the deregulation politics of the Japanese govern ment, in abroad the finance sector and other services overseas became more free. Corre sponding to the worldwide deregulation and liberalization in finance business, they integrat ed their banks into a strategy to globalize their economic activity (ELI, 1988) . However, a strong trade position in the service sector will have consequences on the changes in the eco nomic structure of the country and abroad. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, it seems to become apparent that the Sogo Shosha crystalized a functional use of space. Therefore, the trade function would at first take place in Dusseldorf and Frankfurt and would possess the service function, in which financing has the largest role. According to the regional distri bution of involvement of the Sogo Shosha in the production sector, the southern Germany would receive the function of production in future. for a large part of the Japanese enterprises was laid to the south. As one can pick up from Figure  5 most of the northern districts have two or more Japanese plants while the southern until now had only received one plant per district. This is also to be un derstood as a result of the diffusion process.
The surrounding areas of the early innovation centers are earlier effected than the later center by the wavelike spread. Therefore, the north ern districts adopted more plants.
petitors in the engineering and electronics in dustries located their enterprises tendentiously more to the south of West Germany, where most of their German competitors are located. For the bulk of firms the persistence in the Japanese enclave Dusseldorf has been strong, but caused by the alternations of both the German urban-economic system and the Japa nese investment structure, the direction of the diffusion process was laid to the south. The innovation centers of the hierarchical diffusion process have been Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munchen. From these centers a wavelike diffusion directed to the hinterlands took place with distinct phases. In other words, the given urban structure and previous settlement of Japanese firms modified the spatial behavior. In the third period (1980 -1989) , the powerful trading companies again spread out their activities. As they became highly diversified, their locational choices also grew more differentiated.
This also caused a functional alignment of the other firms.
The expansion of service and production arose rapidly and production facilities were grouped in cluster around the innovation centers, where the service enterprises were located. 1) The mean information field describes a negative logarithmic relationship between the probability of contact between any cell and the center, and the distance separating them. The more devel oped a society is, the distance gradient is bent fl atter and the possibility of communication over long distance is greater (ABLER et al., 1977) . Ac cording to this, less developed systems have a steep gradient. Among other things within this study, it should be researched in greater detail whether and how the distance gradient changed over time. 2) Because there was no data available to calculate the possibility of information flows between the JIHK and the regions of possible settlement, fic titious values were used. 3) This is in so far as legitimate as PRED (1975) already pointed out in that there are only small range-size-differences over a long period. 4) Direct investment is a form of foreign invest ment. Direct investment constitutes a capital export by economic objects of a country with the aim to erect branches or to acquire real estate, plants or foreign firms or a share of them, which grant a decisive influence on firm policy. Be cause Japanese direct investment of the produc tion sector in the USA was carried out according to takeover strategies, in the Federal Republic of Germany a similar strategy was suspected, but this kind of direct investment is set equal only to Japanese enterprises and will be named in the following "Japanese enterprises" as also invest ment in other sectors. 5) According to the idea of diffusional studies, a similar role had been played by the branch office of German employment exchange in Ismir for the spatial diffusion of Turkish workers in West Germany. 6) The German administration and cooperating fi rms actually reported their fear of an invest ment drain, because nowadays the trade sector depends heavily on Japanese economic activity. 7) This measure is formed by comparing the ex ports of a branch with its corresponding imports. The difference, which could be called the secto rial net foreign trade position, is set into relation with the net foreign trade position of the na tional economy. 
